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Divided Justice? Judicial Structures
in Federal and Confederal States
H. Patrick Glenn*
INTRODUCTION

The division of legislative authority is the mark of the contemporary,
complex state whether it is federal or confederal in character.' The division
of judicial authority enjoys less favor. Even in states recognized as federal,
there may be resistance to application of federal principles to the judiciary.
What explains the reluctance to divide the pursuit of justice? Why is the
reluctance overcome in some instances? What are the results? This Paper will
attempt to provide responses to these questions from the perspective of the
Canadian Confederation (as it has been known), 2 as compared to the United
States and Australian federations3 by examining successively: (1) Basic
Premises; (II) Structural Variations; and (III) inevitably, Resulting Problems.
I. BAsIc PREMISES

Attitudes toward judicial structures appear heavily influenced by
underlying attitudes concerning the nature of law, the nature of the particular
complex state, and the administration of justice. Differences have emerged in
these regards among Canada, the United States, and Australia, although it is
interesting to observe that the same themes have figured in the debates in all
three countries.
Canadian judicial structures clearly have been influenced by underlying
ideas concerning the nature of both the common and civil laws. In neither
legal tradition has there been institutional acceptance of the idea of law as the
product, exclusively, of national political or legal officials. In common-law
Canada, a national, binding concept of stare decisis never has been accepted

* Peter M. Laing Professor of Law, of the Faculty of Law and Institute of Comparative Law,
McGill University.
1. The same is true of the essentially unitary state which tolerates a level of regional or local
autonomy in one or more regions.
2. The language of federalism, as opposed to confederalism, has been increasingly used in
Canada in recent years, largely as a reflection of the growth of Federal power. In terms of
judicial authority, however, the confederal character of the structures still is very much in
evidence.
3. For similar treatments of the subject, see Peter Hogg, Federalismand the Jurisprudence
of Canadian Courts, 30 U.N.B.L.J. 9 (1981) and Bora Laskin, Comparative Constitutional
Law-Common Problems: Australia, Canada, United States of America, 51 AUST. L.J. 450
(1977).
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fully and an earlier tradition of the common law as a relatively free search for
solutions has remained dominant. In Quebec, the civil-law codifications of
1866 and 1994 did not radically abolish pre-existing law, largely drawn from
French sources, and the Quebec codification process has not demonstrated the
apparent abruptness of the continental codifications. In common-law Canada
and Quebec, the use of persuasive, nonnational authority is widespread as a
judicial practice. 4 In common-law Canada in particular the use of American
and Australian case law is well-known. A recent survey of common-law
Canadian citation practices indicated that Canadian provincial courts cited
decisions from their own jurisdiction in proportions ranging from only four to
forty percent of all citations.'
For most of the present century this has not been seen as a modem view
of law. Its roots certainly precede the movement of national positivism of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It may well be, however, the view of law
that prevails in a future, transnational world and there appears to be little
prospect of its abandonment in Canada. Its influence on court structures has
been profound and appears likely to continue. If the common and civil laws
are seen in this manner, it is not possible to think of either of them as being
confined or limited by provincial, state or national boundaries. If there is no
provincially distinct common law, there is no strong case for a particular
judiciary established exclusively for its administration. Different arguments
can be made with respect to the administration of provincial legislation, but
they are unlikely to carry the day by themselves given the historical biases of
the common law. If there are no particular provincial common laws, it
follows that there is no particular Federal common law. From a common law
perspective there is therefore no need to federalize the judiciary. Federal
principles should apply only to legislative authority. The mere possibility that
a legislature may attempt to change the common law does not mean that the
common law is identified exclusively with that legislature.
This underlying view of law appears to have exercised the most influence
in Canada. It also is widely subscribed to in Australia, although it has
exercised less influence there on court structures. It has received the least
support in the last two centuries in the United States, where it appears to have
had very little influence on court structures. In Australia, Sir Owen Dixon
expressed the view that "[o]ur conception of the unity of the law might
naturally have led us to regard the courts of law as established to administer
justice, not as agents either of State or Commonwealth, but. . . administering
the law of the land independently of its source . . . . "' Measures tending to

4. See generallyH. Patrick Glenn, PersuasiveAuthority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261 (1937).
5. H. Patrick Glenn, The Common Law in Canada, 74 CAN. B. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
6. Address to the Section of the American BarAssociationfor International& Comparative
Law, 17 AusTL. L.J. 138, 140 (1943) cited in HAROLD E. RENFREE, THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
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the federalization of the Australian court system have thus tended to rely on
the need to ensure administration of statutory law by a judiciary drawing its
support from the same source as the statutes.7 In the United States, the notion
of an indivisible common law was opposed in the name of distinctive state
common laws seen as "means of fitting the common law into an emerging
system of popular sovereignty, "' and there is less resistance in principle in the
United States to the concept of a Federal common law than in Canada and
Australia. The distinction between statutory law and common law has thus
been seen as less important in the United States, and the argument of Madison
eventually prevailed, although not without major opposition from the AntiFederalists,' that "'A government without a proper executive and judiciary
would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms and legs to act or
move.""
A "proper" judiciary in the United States thus became either
Federal or state in character. The judiciary became subject to the principles
of federalism.

SYSTEM OF AUSTRALIA 533 (1984). For further Australian judicial support of this view, see
H.K. LMicke, The Common Law: JudicialImpartiality and Judge-Made Law, 98 L.Q.R. 29, 45
(1982) and Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in
PRECEDENT IN LAWv 73, 75 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). For explanation of this unity of law
not in terms of uniformity of results or content but in terms of the inseparability of sources and
open judicial discourse, see Glenn, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., M.H. Byers and P.B. Toose, The Necessity for a New Federal Court, 36
AUsTL. L.J. 308, 313 (1963) ("This device of investing the State courts with federal jurisdiction
virtually means that the Federal Government hands over administration of the Statutes involved
to State Governments without considering whether such State Governments might be or become
hostile, friendly or merely disinterested.") (footnote omitted). This view appears to give very
short shrift to the traditional independence of the Australian judiciary.
8. MORTON J. HOROwVrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (citing

J. Root, On the Common Law of Connecticut(1798)). The emergence of state reports and the
popular election of state judges were related and reinforcing elements in the process of
domestication of the common law. Today, however, the notion of "Anglo-American law"
remains current in the United States and the flow of citation of cases is in some measure
disrespectful of state boundaries. See Lawrence M. Friedmann, et al., State Supreme Courts:A
Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1981); John H. Merryman, Toward a
Theory of Citations:An EmpiricalStudy of the CitationPracticeof the CaliforniaSupreme Court
in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S.CAL. L. REv. 381 (1977). The United States federalized court
system has itself contributed, however, to the decline in transnational citation of cases, which
remains far less frequent in the United States than in Canada. For comparisons, see Glenn, supra
note 5.
9. For the closeness of the debate and the result, see Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue of
JudicialFederalismin the United States, 46 S.C. L. REv. 837 (1995) (noting the parallel between
Canadian and U.S. Anti-Federalist positions).
10. See Herbert A. Johnson, Historicaland ConstitutionalPerspectives on Cross-vesting of
Court Jurisdiction, 19 MEmE. U.L. REV. 45, 51 n.32 (1993) (quoting DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AT THE CONVENTION HELD IN PHILADELPHIA 158-59

(J. Elliot ed., 1907)).
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These underlying views as to the nature of law were of fundamental
importance in determining attitudes toward court structures. Their effect has
been either reinforced or restricted by consideration of the nature of the
particular complex state in question. Historically Canada has been known as
a confederation, a reflection of the coming together of a number of separate
colonies one of which, Quebec, was markedly different from the others in
terms of language, religion, and legal tradition. The difference between a
confederation and a federation is impossible to establish, but the historic
insistence on the confederate character of the Canadian state has acted as a
check on the growth of Federal power and the federalization of institutions."
Because each of the provinces already was vested with a court system at the
time of confederation and the new structure was confederate in character, there
was no necessary implication for the judiciary, although hard bargaining
evidently occurred and what emerged was not simply a replica of previously
existing court structures. If there is a logical pattern of federalism, for both
legislative and judicial authority, there is no such logical pattern for confederalism insofar as the judiciary is concerned. The concept of a single, undivided
judiciary of general jurisdiction, inherent in the Canadian view of the common
and civil laws, was thus reinforced by the concept of Canada as a Confederation.
In contrast, Australia's more explicitly federal character 2 has had the
effect of restricting or limiting the impact on the court structure of an
underlying view of the unity of the common law. The courts must exist in a
federal structure; they are not necessarily immune, as instruments of
government, from that structure. The fact that Australia's court structures are
different in kind from those of the United States appears to be a result of the
effort to reconcile federalism and an underlying, unified concept of the
common law. In the United States, however, there is a fundamental
compatibility of principles. The common law is divisible; it and its judiciary
are thus divisible according to the principles of federalism that control the
entire governmental apparatus.
Finally, considerations ofjudicial administration cannot be excluded from
a list of Basic Premises. The starting premise is that of the desirability of a
simple, expeditious judicial system. A single court of general, residual

11. The same may be said of another well-known confederation, Switzerland, where the
notion of Federal authority is one of inherent limitation. Swiss courts are cantonal in character,
although a Federal court sits as ultimate court of appeal. The same type of court structure
prevails in Germany, which is, however, recognized as a federation. The United States Articles
of Confederation of the 1780s made no provision for any form of Federal judiciary.
12. See JomN QuicK & ROBERT R. GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSITUTION OF THE
AUSTRAIrAN ComoNwEmT 332 (1901) ("The Federal ideal, therefore, pervades and largely
dominates the structure of the newly-created community, its parliamentary, executive and
judiciary departments.").
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jurisdiction is therefore favored. All of the countries dealt with here share this
point of departure. Notably absent is the idea of a separate court structure for
public law matters, as prevails on the European continent. The common-law
judiciary has historically been successful in maintaining the idea of a single,
integrated judiciary, in public and private law. Federalism exercised its
attraction here as well, however. Since the Federal governments could not
have their own system of administrative law courts, for administration of their
legislation, the argument became one of having their own courts, tout court.
This too was met by the idea that lawsuits and disputes do not follow public
and private or state and federal divisions, but simplicity is only a minor virtue
in complex states. Arguments about simplicity and cost continue to be raised
today and will be raised again in Part III of this Paper, but they are relative
concepts. None of the jurisdictions concerned is today as simple as it might
have been. There are too many other forces at work.
II. STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS

How have these Basic Premises played out in the different political and
social contexts in which they have been the object of debate? Given the
different levels of acceptance of Basic Premises, there is no over-all judicial
structure common to the three countries. At the level of structures, the United
States' system is the simplest. This might appear surprising to American
lawyers, but the complexity of the law of courts in the United States flows
from problems of implementation and not from complexity or inconsistency
of underlying ideas. The United States structures flow directly from the
governing ideas of particular laws and federalism. It follows that each
jurisdiction has its own courts. Problems arise thereafter, but the point of
departure is clear enough and does not appear to be challenged in the United
States today.'
In contrast, the basic structures of Australia and Canada are more difficult
to describe and fix. The distinction between structures and implementation is
more difficult to draw, and in both countries the tension between unitary and
federal models of court structures has been the object of ongoing structural
debate, and ongoing structural change.
While subscribing to a unitary concept of the common law, Australia's
version of federalism has been recognized as applying to court structures.
From different perspectives, each one of the two Basic Premises of a unitary
common law and federalism can be seen as dominating, or potentially
13. See generally Baker, supra, note 9, and notably the title, A Catalogue of Judicial
Federalismin the United States. The federal character of the U.S. court system was established
by the JudiciaryAct of 1789, but the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts was originally very
limited. See generallyHenry J. Bourguignon, The FederalKey to the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 46
S.C. L. REv. 647 (1995).
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dominating, Australian court structures. Federalism in relation to courts is
found in the Constitution's recognition of a Commonwealth judicial power,
which includes the creation of the High Court, creation of other federal courts,
and vesting state courts with jurisdiction in Federal matters .14 The logic of
this structure is binary, or federal. On the other hand, Federal courts were not
created directly by the Constitution and state courts, staffed by state judges,
continued to function as courts of general, residual jurisdiction. This
asymmetry, or limping judicial federalism, was reinforced by the general and
long-standing refusal of the Commonwealth to create a system of Federal
courts and by its willingness to vest judicial power in Federal matters in state
courts. The "autochthonous expedient"' 5 was an expedient from the
perspective of federalism. It was, however, "autochthonous" and largely
preserved the principle of a unitary court structure, that of the states, charged
with application of a law still seen as fundamentally unitary. This asymmetry
itself created problems, or perceived problems, however, and the solution to
these problems has resulted in ongoing structural change in Australia."1
In spite of their differences, the U.S. and Australian court structures share
a federal or binary way of thinking. Courts are thought of as Federal or state.
The basic Canadian structure is more difficult to explain since this form of
binary opposition was rejected, yet it was evidently impossible to continue
with the idea of a unitary court such as that known in English legal history.
If it is appropriate to speak of the U.S. court structure as federal and the
Australian court structure as asymmetrically federal, perhaps the Canadian
structure is best described as asymmetrically confederal! As in Australia, the
superior courts of the provinces continue to exist as courts of general, residual
jurisdiction. As in Australia, the Canadian Constitution recognizes a Federal
power that extends to creation and administration of the Supreme Court of
Canada as a final court of appeal for all Canadian jurisdictions, and creation
of other Federal courts, at least for purposes of administration of the "laws of
Canada.'
As in Australia, there has been reluctance to make use of the
Federal judicial power and provincial courts are responsible for application of
much Federal legislation. The most unique feature of the Canadian judicial
structure is found, however, in the Federal appointment and remuneration (and
potential removal) of the superior court judges of the provincially-administered
superior courts. No one has been able to establish precise historical grounds
for this Federal participation in the structure of the provincial, unitary court
structure. Professor Hogg suggests that it is "not unreasonable" given the
14. See generally J. CRAWFORD, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAw 25 (1982); Renfree, supra,

note 6, at 531-555; Johnson, supra, note 10, at 49-61.
15. The Queen v. Kirby; Exparte the Boilermakers' Society of Australia, 94 C.L.R. 254,
268 (1956).
16. See infra, Part III.
17. See infra, Part III for discussion of the limiting effect of this grant of authority.
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residual authority of the provincial courts 8 and states that the "answer that
has become conventional" as that of insulating the judges ftom local
pressures.' 9 Professor Lederman spoke of the collaborative character of the
system, and this ultimately may be the most interesting feature of it, a
reflection of underlying ideas of law and state.2" At a more prosaic level, the
provinces may not have been able to pay judicial salaries. The potentially
centrifugal character of Quebec law also may have been a consideration. 2 '
Some indication of the effect of these basic structures is given by the
number of judges in each country who are clearly recognizable as Federal.
In the United States the number is clearly the largest at approximately 1100,22
and for a long period the United States also clearly had the highest density per
capita of Federal judges. In Australia, however, the number of Federal judges
appears to be approaching 100 and this would mean Australia, with a
population approaching 20 million, is the jurisdiction having most intensively
implanted the Federal judiciary. The "autochthonous expedient" has thus not
held as a basic structure, given the problems it has created. In Canada there
are fewer than 40 Federal judges. The Federal participation in the provincially administered court structure clearly has dampened the growth of a purely
Federal judiciary. In each of the jurisdictions, however, there are large
problems and in some cases ongoing structural change.
I.

RESULTING PROBLEMS

The variable court structures of the United States, Australia, and Canada
appear to have been dictated largely by the first two of our Basic Premises: the
controlling concept of law and the controlling concept of the particular
complex state. It is in the implementation of these variable court structures
that the third Basic Premise-the administration of justice-assumes greater
weight. Indeed, the essential part of our subject appears to reside here. What
problems in the administration of justice are created by each of the structures

18. Hogg, supra note 3, at 15, (describing the solution as "anomalous" in a "federal
system"). Id.
19. PETIRHOGG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 165 (3rd ed., 1992).
20. W.R. Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary, 34 CAN. B. REv. 1139, 1161
(1956); W.R. Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciaryin THE CANADIAN JUDICIARY 1, 7
(A. Linden ed., 1976).
21. On the importance of Quebec in the debate over the creation of the Supreme Court of
Canada, see Richard .C. Risk, Canada[:] The Puzzle of Jurisdiction,46 S.C. L. REv. 703
(1995). On the retention of provincial courts, Professor Risk concludes that the question "was
never debated in any substantial way, and any explanation needs to be constructed from the
context of politics and ideas." Id. The same conclusion appears appropriate for the more precise
question of the Federal appointing power.
22. See Baker, supra, note 9. The figure includes circuit appellate judges, district judges,
and bankruptcy judges.
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which have been adopted? Are the resulting problems justifiable? Or do they
require re-assessment of Basic Premises? All of the jurisdictions have
resulting problems, and it is not evident that any of them have discovered
solutions to them. In the absence of solutions, whose problems are the better
problems?
The problems that have arisen appear to be of two kinds: those of design
and those of implementation. Canada and Australia have problems of both
kinds. The design of their court structures is the object of ongoing debate and
refinement; its description at any time is difficult and complex. They also
have problems of implementation that are closely related to their problems of
design. The U.S., in contrast, has problems only of implementation. The
design of its federal court structure appears to be perfect or, more precisely,
it is a perfect federal court system. Each of its constituent parts appears
dictated by the logic of judicial federalism. Let us therefore examine first the
United States. Its problems are the simplest to describe, although they may
well be the most difficult to resolve.
The problems of implementation raised by U.S. judicial federalism are
those of division and conflict within the system of administration of justice.
To the insoluble larger problem of meeting the demand for judicial resources
in a liberal, democratic state is thus added the duplication, cost and inefficiency inherent in any form of federal or confederal structure. In the U.S., these
problems of implementation can be recited, although not described, under the
headings of the definition of Federal law and Federal questions, diversity,
supplementary (ancillary and pendent) jurisdiction, removal, coordination
(inter-jurisdictional abstention and preclusion) and Supreme Court review.Y
The U.S. law of courts is one of the monuments of the modem world. It may
be understood by no one. Underlying its complexity have been two basic
needs: that of defining the boundaries of state and Federal jurisdiction and the
need to assert, through jurisdictional rules, a means of control or surveillance
of the particularist concepts of law and jurisdiction inherent in the basic design
of the system.
Given the residual authority of state courts, the problem of defining state
and Federal jurisdiction has been largely that of defining Federal jurisdiction.
Unlike the situation in Australia and Canada, however, there appears to be
little conceptual objection in the United States to the notion of a Federal
common law as a logical counterpart to the various state common laws.
Indeed, the idea of a Federal common law was taken to the extreme position
throughout most of the history of the United States of existing even in the
domain of state law when diversity jurisdiction was exercised.' Although

23. See generally Baker, supra, note 9.

24. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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this view has been abandoned,' federal common law may be found to exist
when it is seen in the national interest. In a federal system, this is likely to
be more often the case than in a confederal system and is further encouraged,
in a looping manner, by the Federal court structure available for its implementation and articulation. The U.S. structure is generous towards the idea of
Federal law; its ongoing definition is necessary and important.
The remaining complexity of the U.S. system derives from the need to
control or supervise the particularist concepts of law and jurisdiction that are
anchored in the system. More simply, this means Federal control of state law
and courts. Diversity jurisdiction is the most evident example of this need to
control decentralization; removal and Supreme Court review are further means
of ensuring exits from local forms of justice. Notions of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction ensure Federal control over the contours of any particular lawsuit
where a Federal basis of jurisdiction exists. Given these multiple means of
control and hence of conflict, notions of interjurisdictional preclusion and
abstention appear as palliative measures. They are by no means mechanical
in character, and each requires judicial determination, in one forum, that the
process of the other should be respected.
Since the Australian judicial structure is one of asymmetrical or limping
federalism, it does not have all of the problems of execution of a federalized
system. To the extent the system is federal it has, of course, such problems.
To the extent the structures do not faithfully reflect the logic of federalism,
however, there are ongoing, additional problems of design. The creation of
the Federal Court of Australia in 1976 thus followed complaints from the
Federal level of government that the "autochthonous expedient" led to
excessive reliance on state courts, with attendant delays, while inadequately
protecting Federal interests in the application of Federal laws.26 These
arguments appear largely to mirror those made in the United States in favor
of a federalized court system. The asymmetrically federal system was thus
seen as an inadequate response to the pressures of federalism; the latently
federal features of the Australian structure had to be reinforced and given
more prominence once the structure was put into operation. The Australian

25. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26. The objects of complaint are "[d]elays, differences in interpretation or application
(especially in matters of procedure, which would not in many cases reach the High Court for
scrutiny), and lack of federal administrative control over court-room facilities and over the
number (and appointment) of judges .......
Cp\WFoRD, supra note 14, at 127. See also Brian
R. Opeskin, FederalJurisdictionin Australian Courts:Policiesand Prospects, 46 S.C. L. REv.
765 (1995) (outlining considerations of uniformity, specialty, philosophy, efficacy and history
leading to the creation of the court). It should be noted, however, that the model chosen for the
Federal Court was that of the "small" court model, with jurisdiction not extending to all matters
of federal legislative jurisdiction. Id. The Federal Court was preceded by the creation of the
Family Court of Australia in 1975. In 1994 the Industrial Relations Court of Australia was also
created.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:819

court system has thus become more federalized; its initial design did not
adequately reflect the federal character of the constitution.
With the increase in federalism comes an increase in federal-type
problems. The concepts of associated and accrued jurisdiction and crossvesting accepted in Australian law are thus added to the initial definitional
problem of determining the contours of Federal law and jurisdiction.27 Still,
the Australian structure does not present the full range of elements of control
and supervision of state jurisdiction that are present in the United States. The
unitary concept of law, administered by an independent judiciary, continues
to exert its influence. There is thus hostility to the exercise of High Court
diversity jurisdiction in Australia.28 As well, removal to the Federal Court
under the cross-vesting jurisdiction is not a statutory right of defendants as is
the case in the United States and is subject to discretionary judicial control of
state courts. Finally, the appellate jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in
matters of state law appears to represent, not a control of one level of
jurisdiction over another but the integration of the two, as will be seen to be
the case in Canada. In the result, a unitary concept of the common law
continues to prevail, and the notion of distinct and different state choice-of-law
rules has not emerged.
The problems of design that have emerged in Canada are different from
those known in Australia, and Canada's problems of design tend to overshadow those that might be seen elsewhere as problems of implementation. The
debate over design in Australia has been as to the extent to which state court
jurisdiction should be paralleled by Federal Court jurisdiction. It has been a
debate over federalization, and in the logic of federalism the choice has been
between two sets of courts. In Canada, the same forces of federalization are
present, but the basic judicial structure of the superior courts is collaborative
and neither Federal nor provincial. Federally appointed judges sit in
provincially administered superior courts. The forces of federalization have
had their effect outside this basic court structure, and there has been
federalizing pressure and movement toward the Federal side and toward the
provincial side. Purely Federal courts have been created, but also purely
provincial courts. In the result, the effort in Canada to create a single,
collaborative judicial structure has yielded three judicial structures: one
Federal, one collaborative and one provincial. The ongoing debate about
design is over the respective roles and jurisdiction of these three judicial
structures. Put differently, implementing a single, collaborative judicial

27. These concepts parallel to a certain extent the concepts of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction in the United States. Opeskin, supra note 26.
28. Mary Crock & Ronald McCallum, Australia'sFederalCourts: Their Origins, Structure
and Jurisdiction,46 S.C. L. REV. 719 (1995) (referring to High Court case law). See also
ZELMAN COwEN & LEsLIE ZINES, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN AUsTRALIA 82-103 (2d ed. 1978).
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structure entails an ongoing struggle against federalizing pressures outside the
single structure. The debate is largely in constitutional terms.
The single, collaborative Canadian judicial structure is buttressed by two
constitutional provisions, sections 96 and 101 of the Constitution Act of 1867.
Both of these texts have provided support for, and limitations upon, the growth
of other courts. Section 96 establishes the Federal power of appointment for
superior court judges.' By necessary implication, however, it also denies
to the provinces a power of appointment of judges exercising superior court
functions. There can be no superior provincial courts. One of the most
litigated features of Canadian constitutional law has been as to the definition
of superior court functions.3" All of the provinces have created vast
adjudicative structures, some of which are formally designated as courts, for
administration of provincial legislation.31 Provincial courts also are competent with respect to a large number of Federal crimes. The contours of the
jurisdiction of these purely provincial courts cannot here be traced. What is
important is that the question of their jurisdiction, which in the United States
and Australia is seen as a pure separation of powers question,32 in Canada
has become a major federalism question. To what extent does section 96 and
the creation of a collaborative superior court structure preclude the federalizing
tendency toward local courts? The answer has been: not entirely. Purely
provincial courts have been subsumed, however, into the superior court
structure by virtue of the powers of review and appeal exercised by the
superior courts of first instance and appeal.
Section 101 of the Constitution Act of 1867, provides for the establishment of the Supreme Court of Canada and other Federal courts yet it also has
acted as a buttress for the single, collaborative court structure.33 The Federal
Court of Canada was created in 1971 for reasons that appear to parallel those

29. The text provides: "The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior,
District and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick."
30. See generally P. RUSSELL, THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA: THE THIRD BRANCH OF

GovERNMENT 47-63 (1987); Hogg, supra note 3, at 161-173, 184-200.
31. They also usually exercise small claims jurisdiction in matters governed by the common
law or the Civil Code of Quebec. Authority for the creation of such purely provincial courts is
found in § 92(14) of the Constitution Act of 1867, which establishes provincial authority over
"The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and
Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including
Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts." Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(14).
32. Can adjudicative functions be given to persons not enjoying judicial independence? Can
courts and judges be given nonjudicial functions?
33. The text provides: "The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act,
from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General
Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better
Administration of the Laws of Canada." Constitution Act of 1867 § 101.
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advanced in Australia in favor of the Australian Federal Court, in turn
reflecting those advanced much earlier in the U.S. The Federal Court in
Canada was preceded by the Exchequer Court, of much more limited
jurisdiction. As a purely Federal Court that has subtracted from the
jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts, already staffed by Federally
appointed judges, the Federal Court has been the object of ongoing controversy. Its abolition was called for in the 1980s by at least one provincial
Attorney General. Its jurisdiction has been the object of a number of decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada, which have placed constitutional limits on
its jurisdiction, implicitly re-affmning the priority of the collaborative
structure of provincial superior courts.
The leading decision on the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada
is Quebec North Shore Paper Co. Ltd. v. C.P. Ltd.M In U.S. terms, this
was a diversity case, involving construction of the terminal facilities in Quebec
of an inter-provincial and international industrial railway line. The contract
provided that it was to be governed by Quebec law. The plaintiffs brought
action in the Federal Court, the Federal Court Act provided that the Federal
Court had jurisdiction over claims relating to works and undertakings
connecting a province with any other province or extending beyond the limits
of a province."5 The Supreme Court denied the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court, however, on the grounds that section 101 of the Constitution Act of
1867, allowed creation of Federal courts only for the better administration of
the "laws of Canada" and that this expression required applicable and existing
Federal law in order to establish Federal Court jurisdiction. Such applicable
and existing Federal law did not exist for contractual claims involving private
parties. Thus in Canada there is in principle no Federal common law for
diversity cases and others (since diversity is unknown in Canada). The
concept of the underlying unity of the common law here has resurfaced as
constitutional principle. The decision re-affirms earlier Supreme Court
assertions that there could be no Federal common law in Canada because of
the co-existence of the civil and common laws in Canada and the impossibility
of choosing between them at the Federal level.36 The Canadian Supreme
Court has subsequently recognized the existence of Federal common law in the
fields of maritime law 7 and Crown liability,3 8 but these stand as exceptions to

34. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054 (Can.).
35. R.S.C. 1970, ch. 10 (2nd Supp.).
36. See City of Quebec v. The Queen, 24 S.C.R. 420 at 428 (1894), (per Strong C.J.)
("...the circumstances that the private law of one province, that of Quebec, is derived from a
different source, makes it impossible to say that there is any system of law, apart from statute,
generally prevalent throughout the Dominion.").
37. See ITO-InternationalTerminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. [1986] 1 S.C.R.
752, 28 D.L.R. (4th) 641. The decision has been severely criticized by civil law lawyers. See
A. Bra~n, L'arrgtITO-InternationalTerminal OperatorsLtd. c. Miida Electronics Inc., ou
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to a general prohibition and not, as would be the case in the United States, as
examples of construction of Federal law there where it is generally authorized
and considered necessary in the national interest.
In a number of other respects the Supreme Court has placed important
constitutional limits on Federal Court jurisdiction. While it exercises judicial
review in administrative law matters over Federal agencies and boards, its
jurisdiction does not oust that of the superior courts to determine the
constitutional validity of any Federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on such
agencies and boards. 39 There is also no general concept of supplementary,
ancillary, pendent, associated, accrued or cross-vested jurisdiction allowing the
Federal Court to control and adjudicate on all aspects of a case with which it
has been seized.' The most that can be said is that the Federal Court has
escaped censure in deciding matters governed by provincial law when so doing
has been necessarily incidental to decision of a claim governed by federal
law."' Recent amendments to the Federal Court Act have weakened even the
most traditional area of Federal Court jurisdiction by providing that claims
against the Federal Crown may heard concurrently in either the Federal Court
or the provincial superior courts.42
The role of the Supreme Court of Canada has thus been of great
importance in the ongoing debate over the design of the Canadian court
structure. Two comments appear appropriate in this regard. The first is that,
as a court administered and staffed by the Federal government, the Supreme
Court has not acted in a manner expansive of the Federal judicial power. In
this regard it has acted more as a general court of appeal over all Canadian
court structures, which it is. As such, it has acted according to the Basic
Premises underlying the Canadian court structure and not as an institution of
a particular level of government. The second comment relates to the role of
the Supreme Court as a general court of appeal over provincial courts,
superior courts and Federal courts. As final authority on the merits, in all
court structures, the Supreme Court is a collaborative institution. It is not a

comment 6carterl'applicationdu droit civil dans un litige maritime au Qu6bec, 32 MCGILL L.J.
386 (1987). The decision also raises the question of the civil law origins of English and
Canadian maritime law. For further comment see H.P. Glenn 66 CAN. B. REV. 360 (1987).
38. Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322.
39. See Canadian Labor Relations Board v. Paul L'Anglais Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 147;
Canada (A.G.) v. Law Soc'y [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307.
40. See The Queen v. Thomas Fuller Construction Co. (1958) Ltd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695
(1979) (affirming that no Federal Court jurisdiction over third party claim made by Crown
properly sued in Federal Court); Qu6bec Ready Mix Inc. v. Rocois Construction Inc., [1989] 1
S.C.R. 695 (dismissing Federal Court jurisdiction to rule on damages claim based on provincial
lav appended to damages claim based on Federal law).
41. See Hogg, supra, note 3, at 22 for cases; and generally Hogg, supra, note 19, at 180 on
the notion of "intertwining."
42. S.C. 1990, ch. 8, amending § 17 of the Federal Court Act.
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Federal court exercising powers of review and supervision over otherwise
sovereign local courts43 but is rather an eventual participant in local court
proceedings. Given an underlying concept of unity (although not necessarily
uniformity) of law, the authority of the Supreme Court's decisions thus reaches
across provincial and legislative boundaries. It does not act as an autonomous,
ultimate Court of Appeal for each Canadian jurisdiction, whose separate
common laws it individually crafts, but as a court whose decisions articulate
a law accepted as common, at least for the common-law provinces. Geographic particularity is a feature of the Supreme Court's decisions only for Quebec
cases, and even here there is a great deal of flexibility in the use of sources. 44
The structure and action of the Court thus reinforces, again in a looping
manner, the Basic Premises underlying the collaborative court structure. The
Federal Court has been limited to a subordinate and limited role in this
structure. It goes without saying in this context that there are operative
notions of abstention and inter-jurisdictional preclusion between the Federal
Court and the provincial superior courts. 45
In general terms, the Canadian collaborative structure is thus one that has
largely subjugated the federalizing tendencies within the system. There is no
diversity jurisdiction, no removal to federal courts, no Federal Court
supplementary, ancillary or pendent jurisdiction, no cross-vesting and no
Supreme Court review (as opposed to appeal). While the Constitution
recognizes the federal pressures of the complex state, these have been
constitutionally limited in favor of a single, collaborative structure, designed
to allow local representation while ensuring enforcement of national standards.

43. The Supreme Court has also held that the judiciary is not subject to review on grounds
derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, at least in private law cases governed
by the common law. See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.); cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (affirming the submission
of state court judges to the Constitutional commands, as perceived by federal judges).
44. See Glenn, supra note 4; H. Patrick Glenn, Le droit comparg et la Cour suprene du
Canada in MLANGEs Lous-PMInPPE PIGEON 197 (1989).
45. For superior court abstention in exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction in federal
immigration matters, see, e.g., Peiroo v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1989)
60 D.L.R. (4th) 574; and for superior court abstention in constitutional challenges, see Reza v.
Canada, [1994] S.C.R. 394 and Reference re Legislative Authority over Bypass Pipelines, 64
O.R. (2d) 393 (1988). The Federal Court will also stay proceedingsin respect of a claim against
the Crown where the Crown wishes to institute a counterclaim or third-party proceeding in a
provincial superior court. See Federal Court Act § 50.1. For the preclusive effect of Federal
Court proceedings on parallel superior court proceedings, see Rocois Constr. Inc. v. Dominion
Ready Mix Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 440 (Can.).
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V. CONCLUSION

Which problems of the variable court structures that have been examined
are the better problems? Probably those one knows best. Solutions may thus
be imagined and may appear, at least in the short term, to be workable. There
probably are no solutions, however, to the problems of providing adequate
judicial resources in the liberal, democratic, and complex state. To inexhaustible demand are added the complexities of federal and confederal structures
and none of the jurisdictions examined here is immune from these. Divided
justice is not, therefore, an ideal or evident solution in any jurisdiction. This
flows ultimately, perhaps, from the fact that the administration of justice is a
more difficult process than the making of laws.
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